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Policy Suggestions for Emissions Trading in 
the U.S.A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Light Pollution in the U.S. 1    
Abstract 
 This honors thesis will examine current and theoretical “cap and trade” emissions 
trading schemes in an attempt to make recommendations on how to improve this regulated 
commodity market.  The various control mechanisms available to regulators will be 
discussed: including allocation methodology, benchmarking, banking, variation in design 
frameworks, etc.  To aid and support the proposed policy recommendations, this paper will 
investigate the design framework of the SOx emission trading scheme in the US, the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).  The political, social, 
and economic context of these schemes will be taken into account when considering the 
policy impact of each design framework.   
 After this discussion is complete, this paper will propose recommendations on the 
design and implementation of a domestic ‘cap and trade’ scheme.  Possible control 
mechanisms for a design framework will be recommended.   In addition, a relatively new 
component of the “cap and trade” scheme will be introduced.  This paper will propose the 
creation of a congressionally appointed committee to oversee the carbon allowances market 
in a theoretical U.S emissions trading scheme.  Its objective will be to: (1) prevent dramatic 
short-term flux in allowance values; (2) provide politically shielded oversight capabilities; (3) 
assess the impact of the domestic design framework; (4) update allowances when new 
information becomes available; (5) encourage ‘green’ technology implementation and R&D; 
(6) raise investor confidence in a cap and trade scheme.  
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Climate Change and CO2 Concentrations 
 According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global surface 
temperatures increased 1.33 (+/- 0.32) • during the 20th century.2  The panel attributed most of 
the observed temperature increase since the mid 20th century to human activity, stating that 
causality was “very likely.”2  The IPCC report demonstrates that current trends are the result of 
Earth’s climate responding to variations in atmospheric composition, namely variations in 
greenhouse gas concentrations (water vapor, CO2, CH4, O3, etc.).2  It goes on to indicate that 
global surface temperatures will raise another 2.0 - 11.5 • during the 21st century, which will 
have severe implications for most of the global population.  These findings have sparked an 
intense debate on the proper course of action to mitigate or prevent the negative implications of 
the predicted increase in temperature.2 
Figure 1.1- Temperature trends over the past 2000 years. 3 
   
  Global concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased by 36% since 1750, from 280 
parts per million to 382 ppm in 2006.4  CO2 concentrations are currently increasing at a rate of 
1.9 ppmv/year, with almost all of the observed increase in carbon dioxide due to human 
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activities.2 According to the EPA, “the radiative forcing contribution (since 1750) from 
increasing concentrations of well-mixed greenhouse gases (including CO2, CH4, N2O, CFCs, 
HCFCs, and fluorinated gases) is estimated to be +2.64 Watts per square meter - over half due to 
increases in CO2 (+1.66 Watts per square meter).”4  This finding is significant because it 
demonstrates that greenhouse gases cause climate change.  In addition, it shows that the majority 
of the greenhouse gas effect is due to rising CO2 concentrations.   
Domestic Emissions 
 Although climate change is global in scope, there is much domestically that can be done 
to address the problem.  The United States emits 5,752,289 thousand metric tons annually of 
carbon dioxide, accounting for 20.2% of global CO2 emissions.5  Fossil fuel use from stationary 
sources accounts for ~ 50%  of these emissions.  Thus by targeting only stationary sources, the 
U.S. can potentially reduce world CO2 emissions by 10%.  Per capita emissions for U.S. citizens 
weigh in at 18.99 metric tons CO2/year- roughly 77% higher than the world average.5  As a 
major contributor (in both gross and per capita emissions) to the current increase in greenhouse 
gases, we have a responsibility to the global community to reduce our emissions as much as 
possible.  It is a moral imperative for the U.S. to act, if not lead, in the fight against climate 
change.   
 In addition to the moral and ethical considerations, there are several ancillary benefits 
from reducing our carbon “footprint,” including potentially significant health, ecosystem, water 
quality, and air quality benefits.  In the U.S, fine particulate matter emitted by fossil fuel burning 
power plants results in over 30,000 deaths per year (which is significant when compared to the 
drunk driving death rate of ~ 16,000/year).6  This pollution also causes more than 600,000 
asthma attacks per year, some of which result in hospitalizations.  All told, the health costs of 
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fossil fuel use for electric generation total in excess of $100 billion/year.  This number excludes 
the costs resulting from the 48 tons of mercury and 71.1 million tons of fly ash produced 
annually by coal power plants.7  For a complete cost benefit analysis of potential ancillary 
benefits, please refer to source.8  These costs, combined with the discounted potential benefits of 
combating climate change, add up to a significant increase in societal welfare if action is taken to 
reduce/eliminate fossil fuel use.   
Legal Ramifications 
 The legal ramifications of combating climate change must be considered before action is 
taken to reduce domestic emissions.  In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled in the case Massachusetts 
v. the Environmental Protection Agency that the regulation of greenhouse gases was required by 
the Clean Air Act.9  The Court further required the EPA to review its contention to forgo 
regulating greenhouse gases, forcing the agency to provide a stronger rationale before pursuing 
inaction.9  Many sources, including those inside the EPA, believe that agency is “ill-suited for 
the task of regulating global greenhouse gases.”9  In other words, an alternative to EPA 
regulation is preferable in regards to regulating GHG emissions.  The EPA would be excused 
from the responsibility of regulating greenhouse gases if the U.S. Congress passes legislation to 
perform this task.   
 The best legislative option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions is currently under 
much debate.  This paper will attempt to shed some light on this issue by presenting the most 
prominent emissions reduction strategies and demonstrating that an emissions quota is the most 
politically feasible approach.  It will then examine current and theoretical cap and trade 
schemes in global and domestic markets including: the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-ETS, and the 
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SOx market in the U.S. in order to recommend a design framework that will ensure an 
efficient and successful implementation of a domestic cap and trade scheme.  
Emission Reduction Strategies 
 A variety of strategies have been proposed to reduce emissions from stationary sources- 
the most prominent of which are an emission tax and an emissions quota.   
Emissions Tax 
 A GHG emissions tax is an indirect tax on any regulated activity that produces GHG 
emissions.  It functions as a price instrument, adding a transaction cost to emissions causing 
activities, thus raising the marginal cost of emissions to a socially appropriate level.  An 
emissions tax is considered a Pigovian tax, which is used to correct for market failures in the 
event of a negative externality.  In this case, the market fails to take into account the societal and 
environmental costs of GHG emissions, graphically: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Pigovian Tax 3 
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-A Pigovian tax shifts the marginal private cost curve up by the amount of the tax. Faced with 
this cost increase, the producers have an incentive to reduce output to the socially optimum level 
by reducing the marginal externality to the marginal tax. The total tax revenue (which could be 
used to mitigate the effect of the negative externality) is equal to the size of the tax times the new 
output (the shaded area).3 
 Unfortunately, in today’s economy an additional carbon tax may be unpalatable.  This 
has prompted the Environmental Defense Fund to believe “[the chances of] passing a new 
(emissions) tax fall somewhere between zero and nil.”10  An alternative to the emissions tax is an 
emissions quota, or “cap and trade.” 
Cap & Trade 
 From the EPA website: “Cap and trade is an environmental policy tool that delivers 
results with a mandatory cap on emissions while providing emission sources flexibility in how 
they comply.”4  It is an administrative approach to control emissions that is based on economic 
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incentives.  Cap and trade has the potential to provide environmental accountability without 
inhibiting economic growth. 
In a cap and trade policy, the administration sets an overall cap on emissions per 
compliance period for sources of a targeted pollutant.  Emissions allowances are then allocated 
to these sources, with the total number of allowances never exceeding the cap.  At the end of 
each compliance period each source is required to report all emissions for the targeted pollutant 
and then relinquish a number of allowances equal to emissions.  Allowance trading allows firms 
to comply by exchanging credits on a regulatory market. 
From an economic standpoint, Cap and Trade functions as a quota instrument- a cap is set 
on emissions quantities, allowing price to be determined by market forces. 
Figure 2.2 Cap and Trade11 
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Referencing figure 2.2, quantity is restricted in a cap and trade scheme from the value Q1 
to value Q2.  This restriction alters price from P1 to P(2/3), resulting in the same end result as 
shown in figure 2.1 from a Pigovian tax, with social costs equal to private costs on the margin.  
By restricting quantity in lieu of a tax, a quota relieves the regulating body from determining the 
appropriate price at which social and privatized costs are equal.  Given the many differing 
opinions in the scientific community on the desirable level of allowance prices, many policy 
advocates argue that cap and trade is the only practical solution to combating climate change.8, 12-
17
 
A cap and trade program attempts to minimize the private and social costs of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.  For this objective to be realized, the administrator must ensure the 
scheme results in real emissions reductions without causing undue economic and regulatory 
hardship on participating industries.  With this in mind, there are four distinct potential outcomes 
that may come from instituting a cap and trade scheme.18 
1. The scheme imposes no significant costs upon economic activity, causing little reduction 
in GHG emissions.  There is no change in consumer or producer surplus.  (status-quo) 
2. The scheme succeeds in imposing significant costs upon some parties, but the costs are 
passed-through to the end user.  This price hike increases the demand for lower cost 
alternative fuels, which gain market share and help to reduce GHG emissions.   (win-lose) 
Producer surplus is increased at the cost of consumer surplus, yet social surplus still exceeds 
the dead weight loss caused by this alteration. 
3. The scheme imposes costs on generators, but the costs are passed-through to the end user.  
Alternative fuel sources are not supplied, resulting in higher consumer costs without any 
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reduction in GHG emissions.  Producer surplus is increased at the expense of consumer 
surplus, resulting in no change in social surplus and an increase in dead weight loss.  (lose-
lose) 
4. The scheme imposes costs on generators, who then modify their behavior to avoid the 
potential costs of emitting past available allowances.  GHG emissions are decreased without 
generating undue consumer or producer surplus.  Social surplus is maximized by minimizing 
dead weight loss.  (win win) 
 Figure 2.3 Potential Outcomes 
 Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Not Affected Decreased Decreased Not Affected 
Producer 
Surplus 
Not Affected Increased Decreased Not Affected 
Social Surplus 
(Net Benefits to 
Society) 
Not Affected Increased Decreased Increased 
Dead Weight 
Loss 
Not Affected Significant, but 
SS still + 
Significant Minimized 
The administrator should attempt to ensure that the domestic cap and trade scheme 
implemented results in outcome 4, as this satisfies the stated goals of a domestic cap by utilizing 
the most cost effective and efficient approach.   There are a number of control mechanisms and 
policy options available for this purpose. 
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Control Mechanisms 
 There are several different control mechanisms administrators have at their disposal to 
regulate the allocation and trade of allowances: 
• Upstream v. Downstream Allocation: In an upstream cap and trade system, allowances are 
given to emission producers, importers, and other generators.  In a downstream system, 
allowances are given to the end-user, or consumer.12 
• Phase-in Program: A phased implementation approach enlists firms into the domestic scheme 
over the course of set project timetable.  Large emitters are regulated initially, with coverage 
expanding to a point set by the administrator.  This approach can help to alleviate the 
difficulty in implementing a large system at once.12 
•  Opt-in Program: An opt-in approach allows for firms to voluntarily participate in the scheme 
on a permanent or project-by-project basis.  Opt-in sources must publish baseline emissions 
and have an adequate monitoring plan to be allowed to participate.12 
• Buyer v. Seller Liability: The administrator must determine standing in terms of legal 
liability for verification and reporting of allowances.  Seller liability puts monitoring and 
reporting requirements on the seller.  Buyer liability means the buyer is liable in the event of 
fraudulent or counterfeit credits.  The legal term for buyer liability is Caveat Emptor.   
• Grandfathering v. Auctioning Allowances: The administrator must choose between 
grandfathering and auctioning permits to permit holders.  Grandfathering schemes award 
existing firms allowances based on historical and current data.  New sources generally must 
purchase allowances from these firms to enter the market.  Auction schemes adopt a pay-to-
play approach, where firms bid for allowances on an open market.  Existing firms are not 
awarded for historical production levels. 
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• Output based allocation: Allowances are allocated based on production levels.  This method 
does not create scarcity rents since it provides no incentive to raise the price-cost margin.   
• Allowance Banking: The administrator may allow firms to bank and borrow permits across 
compliance periods.  This will enable firms to better address short term cost concerns. 
Addressing Price Uncertainity 
The goal of a cap and trade scheme for GHG emissions is to reduce emissions in a way 
that minimizes costs and maximize benefits for a given society.  It seeks to correct the market 
failure that occurs when negative externalities are not accounted for in the traditional market.  
For a successful domestic policy to be implemented, a cap and trade scheme must instill investor 
confidence by providing a degree of certainty in allowance prices.  This confidence is vital for 
minimizing the economic impacts and costs of any proposed cap and trade scheme.   
Uncertainty in allowance prices can come from a variety of factors.  In the short-term, 
demand may vary as a result of fluctuating emissions.  Baseline GHG emissions will change year 
to year due to a variety of factors, including weather, economic activity, energy supply, etc. 14  
Short term supply will also vary due to the fluctuating availability of allowances.   Both volume 
and price of available allowances are subject to uncertainty caused by regulatory change, supply 
constraints, estimation errors, and natural variation.14  In the long run, allowance prices can 
significantly deviate from expected values as a result of unforeseen technological or economic 
variation.14  These inherent uncertainties must be overcome if an efficient domestic cap and trade 
policy is to be implemented.   
There are several policy options for addressing uncertainty in allowance prices, 
including: 
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• Establish a committee to review program targets and timetables every compliance cycle.  
This committee will have the authority to change these targets if long-term abatement costs 
prove different than expected. 14 
• Increase public investment in green technologies.  This will signal to investors that the 
government is willing to substantially back the emissions quota scheme. 14 
• Allow banking and borrowing of credits to reduce potential excessive price volatility. 14 
• Establish a Safety Valve or explicit limit on future program costs.  This functions as a price 
ceiling on the allowance markets, meaning that if costs rise above this ceiling emissions will 
be governed by price rather than quantity constraints and emissions will rise above the cap. 14   
• Establish an Allowance Reserve.  This reserve would hold a pool of allowances, in addition 
to and separate from the current-year emissions budget, that could be drawn upon to 
temporarily expand supply if specified market conditions are met. 14 
• Establish a Carbon Market Board. 14  This board would have discretionary authority to 
intervene in GHG allowance markets to ensure smooth functionality.  It would be set up as 
an independent agency, separate from Congress and the administration.  The specifics of this 
board will be discussed later. 
 From the variety of options presented in this section, it becomes clear that there are 
multiple possible combinations and levels of control available to the administrator.  However, it 
is not clear which combination of the above variables will give the greatest possible chance for 
outcome 4, the win-win situation.  We will now explore the effect of the design framework of 
current emissions quota markets on market functionality and efficiency.  From this, we will 
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qualitatively select the most desirable variables to be included in a domestic scheme.  The 
political, economic, and social context of these frameworks will also be considered in order to 
provide comparative context for a potential domestic scheme.  This contextual information will 
provide an overview of potential obstacles that a domestic scheme will have to overcome in 
order to ensure congressional consideration.  A CBA of each of the above variables on a 
domestic scheme and a stakeholder analysis of this project are both excellent future research 
opportunities for those interested. 
The Kyoto Protocol 
Introduction 
 In the 1990’s many countries joined the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change to address the growing concern over climate change and global warming.  The 
Kyoto Protocol was the brain child of this coalition, initially adopted on December 11, 1997 in 
Kyoto, Japan and effective as of the 16th of February, 2005.19  The Protocol is an international 
treaty to reduce GHG emissions. 
 The objective of this protocol is the “stabilization and reconstruction of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”19  To do this, the protocol established a legally binding 
international agreement which required participating nations to reduce GHG emissions by 5.2% 
from 1990 levels by the year 2012. 19  This target dropped to about 2% after the 2000 review 
conference in The Hague.20  The four greenhouse gases regulated under Kyoto are CO2, CH4, 
NOx, and sulphur hexafluoride. 19   Only Annex 1, or industrialized nations, are required to meet 
these emissions quotas, and international aviation and shipping are excluded from this treaty. 19  
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As of November 2009, 37 Annex 1 countries and 187 states have signed and ratified the 
protocol. 19   
 The five principal concepts of the Kyoto Protocol are: 19  
• Commitments to reduce greenhouse gases that are legally binding for annex I countries, 
as well as general commitments for all member countries;
 
• Implementation to meet the Protocol objectives, to prepare policies and measures which 
reduce greenhouse gases; increasing absorption of these gases and use all mechanisms 
available, such as joint implementation, clean development mechanism and emissions 
trading; being rewarded with credits which allow more greenhouse gas emissions at 
home;
 
• Minimizing impacts on developing countries by establishing an adaptation fund for 
climate change;
 
• Accounting, reporting and review to ensure the integrity of the Protocol; 
• Compliance by establishing a compliance committee to enforce commitment to the 
Protocol.
 
Design Framework 
 Emission targets for industrialized country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are expressed as 
levels of allowed emissions, or “assigned amounts”, over the 2008-2012 commitment period. 
Such assigned amounts are denominated in tons (of CO2 equivalent emissions). 19  Industrialized 
countries must first and foremost take domestic action against climate change, but the Protocol 
allows them a certain degree of flexibility in meeting their emission reduction commitments 
through three innovative market-based mechanisms. 19 
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 To participate in these mechanisms, Annex I Parties must meet, among others, the 
following eligibility requirements: 
• They must have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
• They must have calculated their assigned amount in terms of tons of CO2-equivalent 
emissions. 
• They must have in place a national system for estimating emissions and removals of 
greenhouse gases within their territory. 
• They must have in place a national registry to record and track the creation and 
movement of ERUs, CERs, AAUs, and RMUs (explained later) and must annually report 
such information to the secretariat. 
• They must annually report information on emissions and removals to the secretariat. 
Kyoto Mechanisms 19 
 The three Kyoto mechanisms are:  Emissions Trading – known as “the carbon market” – 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). 19  The carbon market 
spawned by these mechanisms is a key tool in reducing emissions worldwide. It was worth 30 
billion USD in 2006 and is set to increase. 19 
 JI and CDM are the two project-based mechanisms that feed the carbon market. JI 
enables industrialized countries to carry out joint implementation projects with other developed 
countries (usually countries with economies in transition), while the CDM involves investment 
in sustainable development projects that reduce emissions in developing countries. 19 
 The mechanism known as “joint implementation,” defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, allows a country with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the Kyoto 
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Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or 
emission removal project in another Annex B Party, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which 
can be counted towards meeting its Kyoto target. 
 Joint implementation offers Parties a flexible and cost-efficient means of fulfilling a part 
of their Kyoto commitments, while the host Party benefits from foreign investment and 
technology transfer.  A JI project must provide a reduction in emissions that is additional to what 
would otherwise have occurred.  Projects must be approved by both parties to be authorized to 
participate by a Party involved in the project.  Projects starting in 2000 and later are eligible for 
JI status, for ERU’s the start date is 2008. 
 If the host party is eligible to transfer/acquire ERUs, it is allowed to verify JI projects and 
issue the appropriate quantify of ERUs.  This procedure is commonly referred to as the “Track 
1” procedure.  If a host Party does not meet all, but only a limited set of eligibility requirements, 
verification of emission reductions or enhancements of removals as being additional has to be 
done through the “Track 2” procedure.  In “Track 2,” an independent entity accredited by the 
JISC has to determine whether the relevant requirements have been met before the host Party can 
issue and transfer ERUs.  A host Party which meets all the eligibility requirements may at any 
time choose to use the verification procedure under the JISC (Track 2 procedure). 
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in Article 12 of the Protocol, allows 
a country with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto 
Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries. 
Such projects can earn salable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one 
ton of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets.  It is the first global, 
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environmental investment and credit scheme of its kind, providing a standardized emissions 
offset instrument, CERs.  A CDM project must provide emission reductions that are additional to 
what would otherwise have occurred. The projects must qualify through a rigorous and public 
registration and issuance process. Approval is given by Designated National Authorities. Public 
funding for CDM project activities must not result in the diversion of official development 
assistance.  The mechanism is overseen by the CDM Executive Board, answerable ultimately to 
the countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  Operational since the beginning of 2006, the 
mechanism has already registered more than 1,650 projects and is anticipated to produce CERs 
amounting to more than 2.9 billion tons of CO2 equivalent in the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol, 2008–2012 .  
Registry Systems 19 
 The ability of Parties to add to their holdings of Kyoto units (e.g. through credits for 
CDM or LULUCF activities) or move units from one country to another (e.g. through emissions 
trading or JI projects) requires registry systems that can track the location of Kyoto units at all 
times.  Two types of registry are being implemented: 
• Governments of the 38 Annex B Parties are implementing national registries, containing 
accounts within which units are held in the name of the government or in the name of 
legal entities authorized by the government to hold and trade units. 
• The UNFCCC secretariat, under the authority of the CDM Executive Board, has 
implemented the CDM registry for issuing CDM credits and distributing them to national 
registries. Accounts in the CDM registry are held only by CDM project participants, as 
the registry does not accept emissions trading between accounts. 
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  In addition to recording the holdings of Kyoto units, these registries “settle” emissions trades by 
delivering units from the accounts of sellers to those of buyers, thus forming the backbone 
infrastructure for the carbon market. 
 Each registry will operate through a link established with the International transaction log 
put in place and administered by the UNFCCC secretariat. The ITL verifies registry transactions, 
in real time, to ensure they are consistent with rules agreed under the Kyoto Protocol. The ITL 
requires registries to terminate transactions they propose that are found to infringe upon the 
Kyoto rules. 
Figure 3.1 Registry Diagram 19 
 In verifying registry transactions, the ITL provides an independent check that unit 
holdings are being recorded accurately in registries. After the Kyoto commitment period is 
finished, the end status of the unit holdings for each Annex B Party will be compared with the 
Party’s emissions over the commitment period in order to assess whether it has complied with its 
emission target under the Kyoto Protocol. 
 In order to address the concern that Parties could "oversell" units, and subsequently be 
unable to meet their own emissions targets, each Party is required to maintain a reserve of ERUs, 
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CERs, AAUs and/or RMUs in its national registry. This reserve, known as the "commitment 
period reserve", should not drop below 90 per cent of the Party's assigned amount or 100 per cent 
of five times its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lowest. 
Reporting Requirements 19  
 The Kyoto Protocol’s effectiveness is dependent upon two critical factors: whether 
Parties follow the Protocol’s rulebook and comply with their commitments; and whether the 
emissions data used to assess compliance is reliable. Recognizing this, the Kyoto Protocol and 
Marrakesh Accords, adopted by CMP 1 in Montreal, Canada, in December 2005, include a set of 
monitoring and compliance procedures to enforce the Protocol’s rules, address any compliance 
problems, and avoid any error in calculating emissions data and accounting for transactions 
under the three Kyoto mechanisms (emissions trading, clean development mechanism and joint 
implementation) and activities related to land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
 The Protocol’s monitoring procedures are based on existing reporting and review 
procedures under the Convention, building on experience gained in the climate change process 
over the past decade. They also involve additional accounting procedures that are needed to track 
and record Parties’ holdings and transactions of Kyoto Protocol units - assigned amount units 
(AAUs), certified emission reductions (CERs) and emission reduction units (ERUs) - and 
removal units (RMUs) generated by LULUCF activities. 
 Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol address reporting and review of information by 
Annex I Parties under the Protocol, as well as national systems and methodologies for the 
preparation of greenhouse gas inventories. 
 
Enforcement 
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 UNFCCC is charged with the authority to regulate participants in the Protocol.  If the 
enforcement branch determines that an annex I country is not in compliance with its emissions 
limitation, then that country is required to make up the difference plus an additional 30%. In 
addition, that country will be suspended from making transfers under an emissions trading 
program. 19  This is designed to provide a check on illicit behavior in the emissions trading 
scheme.  
Summary 
 First, I would like to thank the UNFCCC website for their detailed explanations of the 
design framework of the Kyoto Protocol.  The mechanism, registry, and reporting requirements 
are listed in full on their website- the above summary is not exhaustive.   
In essence, The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement based on upstream, 
grandfathered allocation of credits, which are measured in gross tons of eCO2.  Allowances are 
not based on output.  The treaty is set up as completely voluntary, thus it is an opt-in program, 
with UNFCCC participating countries allowed to “phase-in” upon ratification of the treaty.  With 
all the monitoring and reporting requirements, the protocol instills seller liability in the market.  
Price uncertainty mechanisms, such as safety valves, banking, etc, are largely left to the 
individual countries for implementation.  The only uncertainty mechanisms in the protocol are: 
the commitment period reserve; (discussed above) and the exhaustive monitoring and reporting 
requirements overseen by the CDM executive board and the member Annex 1 countries. 
 In the next section, the economic impact of the Kyoto Protocol will be discussed and a 
determination will be made on if the protocol fulfilled its objectives.  This information will 
enable a qualitative selection of “best” quantity, allocative, uncertainty, and price controls for a 
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domestic scheme.  The potential impact of international trading on a domestic scheme will also 
be discussed. 
Policy Impact 
  Unfortunately, the Kyoto mechanisms have failed to deliver any real reduction in GHG 
emissions, accounting for a trivial 2 ppm drop in CO2 concentrations.20, 21  Where emissions 
reductions have happened, they were typically the result of unrelated policies.  In the former 
communist countries of Eastern Europe, the collapse of highly inefficient polluting industries 
reduced emissions.20  In Britain, the government substitution of coal with North Sea gas 
significantly reduced reliance on coal power and its associated GHG emissions.20  Most annex 
one countries have actually increased emissions since becoming a signatory, achieving required 
reductions almost exclusively through: surplus credits in Eastern Europe annex one countries, JI, 
and CDM mechanisms.20  The cumulative result of these projects is a predicted ~ 20 ppm drop in 
CO2 concentrations by 2050, causing a 0.3 • decrease in temperature. 21  Barely a drop in the 
bucket.  
  The protocol failed due to at least three major factors: the withdrawal of the U.S.; 
revision of Russian/Ukrainian/Eastern Europe energy projections which greatly increased their 
projected allowance surplus; and the subsequent Bonn/Marrakech deal on carbon sinks.22  The 
relative impact of these events can be represented by the diagram below: 
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Figure 3.2 Kyoto commitments and Trading Potential22 
  Figure 3.2 represents observable data on the potential supply-demand balance in 2000. 22  
The main bars show the gap between countries’ emissions and their Kyoto allocation.  US 
emissions in 2000 would have to be reduced by 19.3 % to reach their Kyoto allocation, while 
Russia would have a headroom of ~ 200 MtC (Kyoto Allocation = 7% of 1990 levels).  In fact, 
the headroom of eastern annex one countries was about as large as the shortfall of western annex 
one countries, providing an aggregate emissions equal to 5.2% below 1990 levels--- albeit with a 
tremendous east-west discrepancy. 22   
 
HONORS THESIS   
PAGE 24 OF 52  NATHANIEL WALLSHEIN 
  This balance was completely disrupted in 2001, mainly due to the three factors 
highlighted above.  Inefficient Eastern European economies were collapsing; the Marrakech 
Accords granted countries a certain allowance of carbon sinks from managed forests as shown in 
Figure 4, flooding the market with non-additional offsets; and the U.S. declined to ratify the 
Protocol.  The result of these factors was to leave a tremendous potential supply set against 
reduced demand. 22  The relative impact of these three different elements varies between studies, 
yet all acknowledge that the withdrawal of the US was the primary factor. 22  This imbalance 
caused the price to comply with the Protocol to become negligible for annex one countries, 
resulting in almost no GHG emission reductions.   
  The CDM and JI mechanisms contributed to this imbalance by flooding the market with 
CERs and ERUs.  The design of these mechanisms enabled annex one countries to achieve 
reductions at lower cost than the depreciated trading market, further crippling the protocol.   This 
excessive use of flexibility mechanisms also increased the incentive for fraudulent transactions.  
One glaring example is refrigerant (HCFC) CDM trading in Annex 2 countries.  “Carbon-trading 
expert Michael Wara calculates that Asian HCFC manufacturers can earn almost twice as much 
from Kyoto CDM credits for scrubbing HFC-23 as they can from selling refrigerants, providing 
a perverse incentive to increase their production.  He also estimates that under the CDM, 
manufacturers will be paid $800 million for HFC abatement, while the cost to manufacture is 
only $31 million.”20  This example is not isolated to refrigerants, one study projects that CDM 
activity could have potentially directed as much as 250-600 MtC of GHG ‘abatement’ to 
fraudulent activities. 22     
  With tremendous supply demand imbalance, it becomes clear why the protocol failed.  
The question now is- why was it so sensitive to these factors?  An international agreement should 
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have been robust to macroeconomic risk factors.  It also should have been able to continue even 
if an annex one country reneged on ratifying the Protocol-- it was not.  The answer to this 
question lies in the politics of this treaty. 
  The political foundation for the Kyoto Protocol was tumultuous by all accounts.  The 
Protocol was adopted “against a background of hugely disparate perspectives concerning the 
urgency of action, the costs of limitations, and the appropriate instruments.”21.  There were tense 
negotiations over which countries would be responsible for mitigating GHG emissions.  
Eventually, the council reached an agreement that charged the industrialized countries (annex 
one) with assuming all costs for reducing global GHG emissions because of their high gross and 
per capita emissions 21.  The council implicitly assumed that as countries developed they would 
be brought into the system over time, thus the global problem of climate change was to be 
addressed with a global solution.  This implicit assumption caused the council to base the success 
of the agreement on collective cooperation and participation with the protocol.  Thus, if any 
annex one country decided to not commit, the resulting imbalance could cause it to fail. 
  In an attempt to gain unanimous support for the treaty, the protocol’s emission targets 
were crafted to gain as many signatories as possible.  This ‘lowest common denominator’ 
approach was the council’s attempt to ensure that all annex one countries remained committed 
through the ratifying process.  To satiate all committed annex one countries, the council agreed 
on the following compromises: 
• 
 Allocation of credits based on 1990 levels:  By distributing credits on historical data, rather 
than allowing quantities to be tied to output (output-based allocation) the council opened the 
carbon market to a variety of macroeconomic risk factors including: fossil fuel prices, 
commodity prices, the consumer price index, economic recession, etc.  When credits are tied 
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to output, “Carbon futures are only remotely connected to macroeconomic risk factors.  The 
results are robust to the introduction of energy and institutional variables, which have been 
identified as determinants of CO2 price variation in previous literature, and to a wide range 
of sensitivity tests.  Price fundamentals on the carbon market are essentially a function of 
allowance supply.” (ref ID 68) 
• 
 Allowing JI and CDM flexibility mechanisms in addition to emissions trading: The JI and 
CDM flexibility mechanisms undermined the carbon market by providing lower cost 
alternatives to emissions trading.  This depreciated the already imbalanced market by 
flooding it with alternative, lower cost supply.   
• 
 Limited enforcement capabilities: The limited enforcement capabilities of the council was 
shown to be an insufficient deterrent for counties in non-compliance.21  This lack of 
enforcement allowed fraudulent CDM and JI activities to occur and allowed the free-rider 
problem to become statistically significant in the treaty. 21 
• 
 Delegating market controls and allocative control to the ratifying countries: By delegating 
this control, the council allowed credit costs and controls to be heterogeneous across 
countries.  This heterogeneity, checked in part by the registry and reporting requirements 
discussed above, allowed for some countries to gain a competitive advantage in the carbon 
market.  This advantage served to undermine the treaty’s objectives by creating a perverse 
incentive to design a ‘least’ cost, inefficient (in terms of emissions reductions) framework for 
allocation and control.  
  These compromises had severe implications on the design framework of the treaty, 
resulting in a commitment that was incapable of fulfilling its objectives.  When crafting a 
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domestic scheme, it is important to learn from the mistakes in the design framework of the 
Protocol, so that a U.S. scheme is not sensitive to the same risks as the international treaty. 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
Introduction 
 The EU ETS is the agreement adopted in 2005 by member countries of the European 
Union to achieve compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.  It was the first cross-border tradable 
permit scheme to address GHG emissions, coordinating the efforts of 25 nations and over 9,000 
installations across the EU 18, 23.  The cap and trade model adopted by this scheme was designed 
to minimize the overall cost of reducing GHG emissions while still achieving the goals set forth 
by the Kyoto Protocol. 
 The scheme was the result of intense negotiations between the European Commission, 
stakeholders, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament.  To raise support for the 
EU ETS, the Commission sponsored research with the University of Gothenburg, the Center for 
Clean Air Policy (a Washington D.C. and Brussels based environmental think-tank), the 
University of Athens, and the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies18.  These teams 
investigated the impact and likelihood of success of the EU ETS on reducing GHG emissions to 
Kyoto limits.  After their collective findings were presented to the Commission, the EU ETS was 
adopted unanimously by the Council of Ministers and by a large majority in the European 
Parliament.23   
 In addition to EU endorsement, the scheme enjoyed widespread support from NGO’s and 
industry professionals.23  This support was the result of allocative and control compromises that 
were favorable to large generators of GHG emissions.  The nature of these agreements will be 
discussed in the design framework, below.  
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Design Framework 
 The EU ETS is a decentralized, heterogeneous approach to cap and trade.  Under the 
scheme, the holder of one allowance (EUA) is granted the right to emit one ton of CO2.  The 
amount of EUA allocated to each generator are set by National Allocation Plans (NAPs) 
prepared by the Member States and approved by the European Commission.23 The EU 
Commission is responsible for oversight and enforcement, leaving allocative and ‘cap-setting’ 
control to each Member State.  The five sectors covered under the scheme are: Power and Heat 
Generation, Oil Refineries, Metals, Pulp and Paper, and Energy Intensive Industry.  Only large 
generators in these sectors are subject to regulation, which cumulatively account for ~40% of 
annual EU emissions.  The definition of ‘large’ generators is determined on a state-by-state basis 
as specified by their respective NAP.  NAPs must be renewed by the Member States for each 
trading period.  The first trading period was from 2005-2007, the second one from 2008-2012, 
and the third period will start in 2013.   
National Allocation Plans 
 Each Member State in the EU ETS is required by the EU Commission to prepare and 
implement a NAP.  The NAP determines and specifies the total quantity of CO2 allowances 
allocated to participating industries.  Each Member State must determine allocation ex-ante 
(before each trading period) based on all relative criteria as specified in the EU ETS Directive.24  
This Directive requires that the proposed quantity of allowances must be in line with each 
Member State’s Kyoto Target24.  The use of Kyoto flexibility mechanisms (CDM & JI) are 
allowed in NAPs under the ‘Linking Directive’ if specified ex-ante24.  Plans are forbidden to 
grant competitive advantage to industry sector or participating firms, and must be in compliance 
with EU’s competition and state aid rules24.  Other criteria relate to provisions in the plan for 
new entrants, the accommodation of early reduction efforts and clean technology24.  Plans must 
HONORS THESIS   
PAGE 29 OF 52  NATHANIEL WALLSHEIN 
set limits to guarantee that a significant reduction of GHG emissions occurs domestically (within 
the EU) 24. 
 Once drafted, a NAP must be submitted to the EU Commission for review.  The 
Commission may choose to accept, partially accept, partially reject, or reject a NAP.  Accepted 
NAPs signal the end of the allocation process.  Plans are then finalized and submitted to the 
Member States’ national registry.  Rejected NAPs must be changed according to the guidelines 
set by the Commission, then resubmitted for review.  Plans that are partially rejected or accepted 
need only to implement the proposed changes to qualify for emissions trading, there is no need 
for further review.  After Commission approval, the Member State is allowed to alter the plan if 
improved data becomes available. However, under no circumstance can the total number of 
credits increase without resubmitting the NAP.  Once the final allocation decision at the national 
level has been taken and the final plan is published, no more changes whatsoever to the number 
of allowances in total or per plant can be made24. The final allocation decision concludes the 
allocation process and opens formally the market for allowances in the Member State24. 
Monitoring and Reporting Requirements 
All EUA allowances are recorded according to the EU ‘monitoring and reporting 
guidelines’ (MRG) in each Member State’s National Registry.  These Registries are communally 
linked through the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL), overseen by the EU 
Commission.  The CITL checks each EUA transaction for irregularities.  Article 14 of the EU 
directive requires Member States to ensure all participating firms accurately monitor and report 
CO2 emissions in accordance with ‘MRG’ guidelines24.   
The MRG define “monitoring methodology” as the methodology used for the 
determination of emissions; specifying how an operator of an installation will carry out the 
monitoring and reporting of CO2-emissions for that specific installation24.   This includes 
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amongst other things the fuel and material streams to be monitored, the choice of tiers for all 
elements of the emission calculation, a description of metering devices (location, technology, 
uncertainty), a detailed description of emission measurement systems (if applicable) as well as 
QA/QC procedures for monitoring and reporting, e.g. for the processes of data collection and 
emission calculation24.   The approved documentation of the monitoring methodology is part of 
or connected to the permit of an installation24.   Once approved, the installation has to implement 
and execute the monitoring of its greenhouse gas emissions in accordance to the approved 
“monitoring methodology” 24.   This is checked by the national registry as part of the verification 
process24. 
The tier system (section 4.2.2.1.4 of Annex I of MRG 2004) provides a set of building 
blocks to determine the appropriate monitoring methodology for each installation24. The tier 
system defines a hierarchy of different ambition levels for activity data, emission factors and 
oxidation or conversion factors24. The higher the number of the tier chosen, the higher the level 
of accuracy or the more site-specific the monitoring system becomes24.  Please reference figure 
4.1 for a table of applicable tiers.  The operator must, in principle, apply the highest tier level, 
unless he can demonstrate to the competent authority that this is technically not feasible or would 
lead to unreasonably high costs24.  Minor sources, being sources which jointly emit 2.5 ktons or 
less per year or that contribute 5 % or less to an installation’s annual emissions can be monitored 
using lower tiers24.  The same applies to pure biomass24.  Minor sources which jointly emit 0.5 
ktonnes or less per year or that contribute less than 1 % of total annual emissions of an 
installation can be monitored using a no-tier estimation method24.  For complete information on 
MRG guidelines, refer to24. 
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Figure 4.1 Tier Specifications24. 
 
Phase One 
Cap Setting and Allocation 
For the NAPs 1, Member States used differentiated criteria for cap-setting and allocation, 
ranging from ‘less than business as usual’, to a ‘path consistent with the Kyoto Protocol’23.  The 
development of allocation methodologies to distribute emissions rights varied considerably 
between states, most notably for new entrants/closure provisions (NE/C).  These provisions were 
implemented to offset the market distortions created from ‘free’ allocation of EUAs in most 
NAPs.  NE provisions allowed new firms to receive a certain amount of ‘free’ credits based on 
projected emissions data.  C provisions compensated inefficient plants for retiring early, rather 
than continuing operation in order to receive EUAs during the next cycle (and thus remaining 
profitable).  To illustrate the variance in these provisions, the following example is presented: A 
cogeneration facility would receive allowances corresponding to 130% of its expected emissions 
in Germany23.   The corresponding figures are 120% for Finland, 90% for Denmark and 60% for 
Sweden23.  For a new natural gas combined cycle electricity production unit (no heat) the 
differences are even larger23.  In Germany the installation would receive 105% of the required 
allowances23.   In Finland 100%, in Denmark 82%, and in Sweden 0% (Sweden does not give 
allowances for non-combined heat and power)23.  This variation has led to increased complexity, 
administrative burdens and transaction costs due to the extra effort required to transfer an EUA 
across borders.23  In addition, this variance has led to selective sector and firm competitive 
advantage in both domestic and international markets23.   
 
Historical and Projected Emissions Data 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Tier 5 
>500 ktons 
(CO2)/yr 
50-500 ktons/yr <50 ktons/yr <2.5 ktons/yr <0.5 ktons/yr 
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 Many NAPs for phase one were highly dependent on industry supplied emissions 
projections and historical emissions data.  This data was a ‘voluntary’ effort by stakeholders; 
with only 3 Member States requiring independent verification23.  This meant there was no way 
for participating States to guarantee that the data was accurate.  It also created a perverse 
incentive for participating firms to ‘inflate’ historical and projected emissions data.  The 
consequence of inadequate data collection was to create a surplus of almost 5% of total annual 
allowances across the ETS during phase one, resulting in a massive price shock midway through 
the cycle23.  This shock will be discussed in the policy impact below.  
Benchmarking 
 The lack of a universal benchmark served to compound the problems caused by variation 
in allocation methodology and inadequate data collection.  Benchmarking refers to the idea of 
creating a universal standard, ie. best available technology, that acts as a reference point to 
measure EUA transactions against.  Some Member Sates utilized benchmarks for allocation and 
new entrant/closure provisions, however the metrics varied from state to state.  This prevented 
the potential benefits from being realized across the EU23. 
In phase one, the NAPs designated 95% of the EUA’s for ‘free’ allocation 
(grandfathering).  Phase two reduced the free allocation to 90%.  Auctioning was practiced in 
four Member States, of which only Denmark used the maximum.  The principal reason cited for 
grandfathering EUA’s was to ‘buy’ industry and NGO acceptance23.  There was significant 
lobbying by participating firms against auctioning, who believed they had a strong claim to free 
allocation as a result of prior free use23.  The policy impact of this decision will be discussed 
later. 
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‘Green’ Technology R&D 
One major industry criticism of phase one has been that it discourages investment in new 
and low-carbon investment in ‘green’ technology because of the short allocation period (3 years).  
The uncertainty and risk inherent to new technology R&D typically results in rather long 
investment cycles(ie. +5-10 years) 23.  In light of this fact, the added uncertainty of floating 
carbon prices over relatively short periods is said to create a perverse incentive to discourage 
‘green’ R&D23.  Heterogenic data collection, allocation methodologies, and baseline metrics 
have added to this uncertainty, prompting participating firms to lobby for a uniform baseline and 
longer allocation periods for phase three (2013)23. 
Power Installations  
NGO’s were quick to point out the flaws of EU allocation methodology in the presence 
of largely oligopolistic national or regional power markets.  Power generators operating in non-
ideal markets found it easy to pass on the additional costs of the EU ETS to consumers without 
inducing an end-user switch to low carbon alternatives23.  This enabled power generators in some 
areas to receive windfall profits, creating a perverse incentive to hinder investment in low-carbon 
technologies23.  This effect occurred almost exactly as predicted (by NGOs) during phase one23.   
Tier System 
The tier system was also heavily criticized during phase one.  Tier 4 installations were 
required to participate, accounting for 32% of participating firms, yet only 1% of all emissions23.  
This added tremendous administrative and industry costs to the EU ETS while resulting in a 
trivial decrease in emissions.  Industry lobbyists have pushed for excluding installations that 
produce <25,000 tons CO2 from the EU ETS.  These installations make up 55% of all 
participating firms while emitting only 2.4% of total EU emissions23.  By reducing the number of 
total installations to 4,700, covered emissions could remain as high as 97.6% of the current 
coverage23. 
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Phase Two 
NAPs 2 have shown major improvements over phase one.  Member States were given 
much less leeway on allocation methodology, and data collection.  Tightened Commission 
control of allocation methodology has led to a 9% reduction in NAPs (across 22 Member States) 
plan emission budgets over phase one 23.  The Commission standardized emissions projections 
across the board using 2005 verified data23.  Industry lobbyists have questioned the methodology 
of these projections; however, there is unanimous consent on the need for standardized emissions 
data23.  The Commission failed to implement a universal metric for benchmarking across 
Member States.  Despite this, there has been an increase in benchmarking in domestic power 
sectors23.  Auctioning remains limited in phase two23. 
Summary 
 The EU ETS is a decentralized, heterogeneous approach to Cap and Trade.  Its objective 
is to enable Member States to achieve their Kyoto Targets in the most cost effective and efficient 
way.  To achieve these targets, Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms are allowed in Member State’s 
NAPs. The EU Commission is responsible for oversight of the National Registries and National 
Allocation Plans for each allocation period.  The first period was from 2005-2007; the second 
period was from 2008-2012; and the third period will start in 2013. In essence, The EU ETS is an 
international agreement based on upstream, grandfathered allocation of credits, which are 
measured in gross tons of eCO2.  Allowances are not based on output.  The scheme is neither opt-
in or phase-in.  The MRG guidelines instill seller liability in the market.  Price uncertainty 
mechanisms, such as safety valves, banking, etc, are largely left to the individual countries for 
implementation through NAPs.  The design framework of the EU ETS was heavily influenced by 
industry and NGO’s, with many compromises made on allocation, data collection, and 
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benchmarking.  The effect of these policy decisions will be discussed in the section on policy 
impact, below. 
Policy Impact 
 The EU ETS significantly distorted the carbon market through a complicated, 
heterogeneous design framework.  The major variables causing this distortion were: new 
entrant/closure provisions in NAPs, diverse allocation methodology, a lack of a uniform 
benchmark, and data collection errors.  In addition to the above variables, a flawed tier system 
increased the administrative and economic burden of the plan, and Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 
reduced the incentive to curb domestic emissions.   
 Figure 4.2 illustrates the long-term effect of uniform new entrant/closure (NE/C) 
provisions in NAPs 1.  These provisions were created to offset the market distortion caused from 
grandfathering EUAs to existing facilities.  The NE/C provisions created an incentive to create 
new generators over modifying existing generators to meet increased demand25  Although 
revised in NAPs 2, the NE/C provisions during phase one created a perverse incentive to favor 
carbon-intensive generators over ‘greener’ alternatives.  In figure 4.2, the resulting increase in 
CO2 would hypothetically lead to increased EUA prices, re-stabilizing the level of emissions.  
The CO2 increase depicted in the figure was never realized in practice due to the short allocation 
period of phase one, however the flaw was nonetheless present.  Modifications of NE/C 
provisions in NAPs 2 were sufficient to remove this effect.    
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Long-term effect of increasing levels of uniform new entrant allocation25 
HONORS THESIS   
PAGE 36 OF 52  NATHANIEL WALLSHEIN 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the effect of allocation methods on the Carbon Market.  Most NAPs 
awarded EUA’s using ‘baseline emissions’ and emissions projections.  When baseline emissions 
are used in NAPs, inefficient generators are awarded a large amount of EUAs, creating an 
incentive to remain open (to continue to receive allowances).  This is shown to distort the carbon 
market, creating perverse incentives to increase CO2 intensive capacity, choose inefficient fuels, 
and discourage ‘green’ technology R&D.  
 
Figure 4.3 Effect of Allocation Method on the Carbon Market25 
HONORS THESIS   
PAGE 37 OF 52  NATHANIEL WALLSHEIN 
 
 Figure 4.4 shows the projected effects of different allocation methodology on the UK.  
While not inclusive of the entire EU, it provides a snapshot of the effects of allocation on 
emissions, EUA prices, electric demand, gas use, and coal use in several different scenarios.  NE 
refers to new entrant provisions.  FS refers to fuel-specific benchmarking for NE provisions.  In 
phase two some Member States choose to use FS benchmarking for NE provisions, attempting to 
award EUAs on fuel type rather than emissions.  Thus, the cost of a coal EUA is higher than a 
gas EUA.  Uni benchmarking for NE provisions means a universal benchmark (not fuel-
specific).  Upd refers to updating emissions data and NAPs for each allocation cycle.  No closure 
test refers to the modification of closure provisions to discourage inefficient plant use.  
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Figure 4.4: Impact from differing allocation methodologies on UK; 2005-
201725
 
As shown by the figure above, each variable significantly alters UK emissions, baseload 
prices, etc.  In addition, NE/C provisions open EUAs to macroeconomic risk variables (i.e. rising 
gas prices).  The greatest reduction in emissions occurs when allowances are auctioned or when 
benchmarking is applied to NE provisions and C provisions are modified. 
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Errors in data collection caused a massive price shock in phase one due to an unintended 
surplus of EUAs.  Prices dropped from a peak level in 2006 of €30/EUA to €0.10/EUA in 
September 200725.  This made the price of an EUA irrelevant in participating firm decisions, 
rendering the EU ETS toothless.   
Phase one ETS resulted in a 4.3% increase in emissions among Member States25.  
Significant flaws in the above variables rendered the scheme incapable of curbing domestic 
emissions, although use of flexibility mechanisms may have served to offset some of the 
observed EU CO2 increase.  Phase two data is currently being developed, though most observers 
predict a decrease in CO2 emissions among member states.  When this data becomes available 
the economic impacts of phase two will be open for future research.   
The U.S. Sox Market 
Introduction  
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) introduced the first large-scale cap- and-
trade program for air pollution.  Title IV of the CAAA established a system of tradable permits 
for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions among utilities in the U.S.  The system aimed to remove 10 
million tons per year of SO2 emissions from a 1980 baseline by the year 2010.  Phase I (1995-
1999) of the permit market extracts emission reductions from the 263 most polluting coal-fired 
electricity generating units with an output capacity greater than 100 megawatts (MW), belonging 
to 110 power plants located in 21 eastern and mid-western states26.  These 263 units, also called 
“Table A units”, are allocated a fixed number of permits each year sufficient for an average 
emission rate of 2.5 pounds SO2 per million Btu of average 1985-1987 heat input26.   Power 
plants may select units not originally affected until phase II to enter the program early as 
substituting or compensating units to help fulfill the compliance obligations for “Table A units” 
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targeted by phase I26.  In addition, industrial emission sources, such as refineries and smelters, 
may voluntarily enter the program if they feel they can make emission reductions at low cost 
(opt-in units) 26.   Phase II which began in the year 2000, covers the remaining generating units 
fired by coal, oil and gas with an output capacity greater than 25 MW26.   Units are allocated 
permits sufficient for a more stringent average rate of 1.2 pounds of SO2 per million Btu of 
average 1985-1987 heat input26.   The SO2 permit trading program has dramatically reduced 
emissions faster and at far lower costs than anticipated, yielding wide- ranging environmental 
and human health benefits26.   Thereby, the SO2 program’s successes have encouraged policy 
makers in many countries to establish emissions trading schemes for other pollutants such as 
greenhouse gas emissions26. 
Design Framework 
 Under the CAAA SO2 permit market, one allowance permits a generator to produce one 
ton of SO2.  Allowances are fully marketable commodities, which may be bought, sold, traded, 
or banked for use in future years.  Allowances may not be used for compliance prior to the 
calendar year for which they are allocated.27  However, regardless of how many allowances a 
source holds, it is never entitled to exceed the limits set under Title I of the Act to protect public 
health.27  In accordance with the introduction, allowances are allocated at an emission rate of 1.2 
pounds of SO2/mmBtu of heat input for phase two (2.5 for phase 1).  In addition to annual 
allocations, allowances are also available upon application to three EPA reserves.27  In Phase I, 
units could apply for and receive additional allowances by installing qualifying Phase I 
technology (a technology that can be demonstrated to remove at least 90 percent of the unit's 
SO2 emissions) or by reassigning their reduction requirements among other units employing 
such technology.27 A second reserve provides allowances as incentives for units achieving SO2 
emissions reductions through customer-oriented conservation measures or renewable energy 
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generation.27 The third reserve contains allowances set aside for auction, which are sponsored 
yearly by EPA. Anyone can participate in the annual allowance auction which is held at the end 
of March every year.27  Units that began operating in 1996 or later are not allocated allowances. 
Instead, they have to purchase allowances from the market or from the EPA auction to cover 
their SO2 emissions.27 
 The EPA is responsible for overseeing the monitoring and reporting of SO2 allowances. 
To accomplish this, the EPA maintains an Allowance Management System (AMS).  Each 
affected utility source, corporation, group, or individual holding allowances must register an 
account in the AMS.  Parties must notify EPA to have transfers recorded in their AMS account, 
but it is not necessary to record all transfers with EPA until such time that the allowances are to 
be used to meet a source's SO2 emissions limitation requirement.27  AMS accounts are, however, 
the official records for allowance holdings and transfers used for compliance purposes.27 To 
facilitate tracking and recording, EPA assigns every account an identification number and every 
allowance a serial number.27  Any person or group, including brokers and investors, wishing to 
purchase allowances may open a general AMS account.  If a source's emissions exceed its 
allowances, the source must pay a penalty and surrender allowances for the following year to 
EPA as excess emission offsets.27 
Policy Impact; provided by26. 
 Since the passage of the 1990 CAAA, several studies have attempted to assess the 
efficiency of the SO2 permit market with mixed results. Joskow et al. (1998) assess the 
efficiency of the market for SO2 permits by comparing the price of permits auctioned by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) between 1993 and 1997 with prices associated with 
private confidential trades. Joskow et al. (1998) discover that by late 1994 these prices were 
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almost identical and thereby conclude that the private market for tradable permits was relatively 
efficient. Schmalensee et al. (1998) also conclude that the private market for tradable permits 
was relatively efficient by noting the growth in the level of the trading volume from 1995 to 
1997. Ellerman et al. (2000, pp. 185-190) conclude that the flattening of the term structure after 
1995 provides evidence of a relatively market efficiency. Carlson et al. (2000) find that the 
market failed to realize potential gains from trade in the first two years of phase I. Ellerman 
(2003) and Ellerman et al. (2003) conclude that banking has played an important role in 
improving the economic and environmental performance of SO2 cap-and- trade program. 
Arimura (2003) uses the coal price data from 1985 to 1998 and estimates a hedonic model in 
order to investigate the link between sulfur premium in coal and the permit price. In the first two 
years of the program, he finds that the sulfur premium was higher than the permit price in the 
EPA auction for the range of sulfur from 0 to 0.6 pound per mmbtu. Arimura (2003) argues that 
the deviation is due to the rent exploited by coal mine companies in the west from the high sulfur 
coal. For 1997 and 1998, however, the estimation results show that the permit price is in the 
range of 95% confidence interval for sulfur premium from 0 to 1 pound per mmbtu, suggesting 
that the permit price in the auction reflects the sulfur premium of coal for low sulfur coal. From 
these results, Arimura (2003) concludes that the market is becoming efficient in 1997 and 1998. 
Using an output distance function approach, Swinton (2002, 2004) calculates the shadow prices 
of emission reductions and finds that they diverge among some power plants, suggesting that 
these plants have not taken full advantage of the permit market during much of phase I. Burtraw 
et al. (2005) suggest that this divergence of marginal abatement costs among some plants is due 
to the effects of implementing electricity restructuring in some states which provided incentives 
to reduce costs. Keohane (2006) uses a unit –level econometric model of technique choice, based 
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on actual decision by nearly 1000 units from 1995 to 1999, to estimate what would have 
happened if prescriptive regulation had been employed in place of an emissions trading scheme. 
The results show that cost savings appear to have been lower than estimated by others, noting 
that under the most natural choices of counterfactual regulations, the cost savings from trading, 
relative to a uniform emissions standard, ranged from $148 to $268 million annually: a cost 
savings of 16% to 25%. Ellerman and Montero (2007) show that the aggregate behavior of the 
SO2 bank indicates that most participants have made reasonably efficient abatement decisions 
during the period 1995-2002. Helfand et al. (2007) discover that although the SO2 price path 
does not reflect the Hotteling rule, profit opportunities appear relatively small and quite risky. 
They suggest that the SO2 permit market appears to have been relatively efficient during the 
period 1994-2003. 
 
Discussion 
As evidenced by the extensive research complied by source26 referenced above, the sulfur 
emissions trading scheme fulfilled its objective in a relatively efficient manner.  Reference26 goes 
on to propose that the SO2 futures market adds significant inefficiency into the system because of 
inherent risk premiums, however this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.  Figure 5.1 shows 
the actual versus projected cost of SO2 prices through 2004. 
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of Projected and Actual SO2 allowance prices14 
 
 The nature of the SO2 scheme’s success lies in its simplicity.  Allowances were allocated 
using a baseline of 2.5 pounds SO2 per million Btu for phase 1 and 1.2 pounds of SO2/mmBtu 
for phase two.  New entrants (after 1996) were required to purchase credits through auction, and 
energy efficient firms were allowed to phase-in to the program.  Additional reserves were kept 
by the EPA to encourage development of ‘green’ technologies.  Monitoring, reporting, and 
enforcement were robust and effective with EPA oversight.  This effective design framework 
fulfilled the stated objectives of the CAAA in a cost-effective manner.   
 A key difference between the SO2 market and the EU and Kyoto schemes is 
homogeneity.  In the U.S. scheme, a sulfur allowance is a sulfur allowance is a sulfur allowance.  
There are no ‘flexibility’ mechanisms, or NAPs, or heterogenic allocation methodologies and 
benchmark metrics.  It is simple, limited in scope, and effective.  When designing a domestic cap 
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and trade scheme for carbon emissions, the Sulfur market should have significant weight in the 
design framework.   
Recommendations 
 After reviewing and dissecting the design framework of the Kyoto Protocol, EU ETS, 
and the SOx market, we can now assess the relative effectiveness of the various control 
mechanisms implemented in each scheme.  This assessment will be used to propose design 
framework suggestions for use in a domestic cap and trade scheme.   
 The Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS were largely unsuccessful in fulfilling their stated 
objectives.  Both the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS delegated allocative control and 
methodology to Member States. This was shown to introduce heterogeneity into the market, 
which served to destabilize the carbon ‘currency,’ creating a systemic problem in the entire 
market.  In addition, both schemes allowed for the use of ‘flexibility’ provisions to reach the 
proposed cap on emissions.  These provisions facilitated the ‘outsourcing’ of carbon reductions 
to Annex II countries.  By providing a lower cost alternative to the carbon market, the JD and 
CDM mechanisms created a perverse incentive to delay ‘green’ technology R&D in favor of 
cheaper international projects.  By flooding the market, they also served to further destabilize the 
already unbalanced international carbon price.  The choice to allocate based on total emissions 
rather than output was another major flaw present in both schemes.  Output based allocation was 
shown to reduce the exposure of the carbon market to macroeconomic risk variables.  Data 
collection errors were common in both schemes in early stages, but for the most part have been 
resolved since inception.  The cumulative result of these flaws was to render both schemes 
impotent.   
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 The sulfur market in the U.S. fulfilled its objectives in a cost effective and timely manner.  
It worked because it was relatively simple: Allocation methodology was determined by a central 
authority; flexibility mechanisms were prohibited; allocation was output based; and allowance 
reserves were used to create incentives to develop ‘green’ technologies.  This framework resulted 
in a reduction of SOx at costs much lower than projected. 
 When designing a domestic cap and trade program, regulators should employ the 
following control mechanisms: 
• Output based allocation: output based allocation shields the carbon market from 
macroeconomic risk factors (i.e. rising gas prices or an economic downturn).  It also 
serves as an effective universal baseline metric.  In the absence of NE/C provisions, this 
was shown to result in the least market distortion in the UK.25 
• Auctioning of Allowances: Referencing figure 4.3, auctioning was shown to result 
minimal market distortion.25  This also eliminates the need for new entry/closure 
provisions, forcing all firms to compete in the open market for credits. 
• Homogeneous allocation methodology, with the absence of ‘flexibility’ mechanisms. 
• Use of allowance reserves to encourage green technology R&D.  This should be modeled 
on the current SO2 market. 
• Stringent monitoring and reporting requirements, backed up with effective enforcement 
penalties and oversight.   
In addition to the above recommendations, new legislation should sponsor the creation of a 
congressionally appointed committee to oversee the carbon allowances market in a theoretical 
U.S emissions trading scheme.  Its objective will be to: (1) prevent dramatic short-term flux in 
allowance values; (2) provide politically shielded oversight capabilities; (3) assess the impact of 
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the domestic design framework; (4) update allowances when new information becomes 
available; (5) encourage ‘green’ technology implementation and R&D; (6) raise investor 
confidence in a cap and trade scheme.  This concept was first introduced in bill S. 2191 by 
Lieberman and Warner.14  This bill proposes to establish a ‘Carbon Market Efficiency Board’ to 
oversee GHG allowance markets; however, it fails to specify the mechanics of this board.   
It is my belief that the committee should be congressionally appointed, with terms 10+ years.  
This will shield the members from political pressures.  Appointment should be staggered to 
ensure continuity in board methodology.  This firm would be responsible for creating an annual 
report on the policy impact of the domestic scheme (possibly partnering with DOE).  It would be 
in charge of allocation methodology, oversight, monitoring, and reporting.  Enforcement would 
be carried out by the EPA.  The commission would be charged with developing and 
implementing proper control mechanisms to ensure that the scheme fulfilled its objective.  By 
removing politics from this process, I believe this board will go a long way towards 
implementing a successful emissions quota in the U.S, and it is highly recommended for any cap 
and trade legislation. 
Conclusion 
 This paper investigated the design framework of the SOx emission trading scheme in the 
US, the Kyoto Protocol, and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), while taking 
into account the political, social, and economic context surrounding the development of these 
schemes.  It assessed the policy impact of each scheme in order to make informed 
recommendations for use in the development of a domestic emissions quota.  By dissecting the 
design framework of the three ‘cap and trade’ programs investigated, this paper sought to 
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illustrate the flaws present in each scheme.  Hopefully this information will be used to avoid past 
mistakes when drafting future legislation.   
 In a domestic ‘cap and trade’ program, the following control mechanisms are 
recommended by this report: output based allocation; auctioning; a uniform allocation 
methodology; stringent monitoring and reporting requirements (including data collection); the 
use of allowance reserves to foster development of  ‘green’ technology; and the creation of a 
congressionally appointed committee to oversee, develop, and implement the emissions quota 
scheme.  Future research topics include: a CBA of each of the above variables on a domestic 
scheme; and a stakeholder analysis of this project. 
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